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W
hat happens when two 
giants, climate change and 
the Constitution, come into 
conflict? California is a major 
case in point. Global warm-
ing holds the potential to 
become the single greatest 
environmental problem facing the world communi-
ty. A growing number of states are taking unilateral 
actions to counter this threat. In its traditional posi-
tion, California is playing a leadership role. But the 
Constitution restricts the power of states to address 
certain problems and particularly limits the strate-
gies states can employ to further the interests of their 
citizens. Are California’s vanguard policies constitu-
tionally legitimate?
The threat of climate change does not hinge on 
where GHG emissions occur. On the contrary, be-
cause these gases quickly as-
similate into the global atmo-
sphere, emissions in Florence, 
Italy, have the same global im-
pact as those released in Flor-
ence, California. Yet, even as 
the problem of climate change 
is a global one, its solutions 
are often inherently local. It 
is only through cumulative 
efforts of many that we have 
any hope of addressing the 
problem.
California has placed itself 
on the leading edge of state-
level climate change action. 
Most significantly, in Sep-
tember 2006, Governor Ar-
nold Schwarzenegger signed 
into law California’s Global 
Warming Solutions Act, AB 32.1 AB 32 requires the 
California Air Resources Board to set limits to re-
duce the state’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the 
year 2020.2 This law represents the nation’s first man-
date to reduce GHG emissions across a state’s entire 
economy. The act does not specify how the board 
should go about reducing emissions, but instead 
generally states that the board will adopt regulations 
“to achieve the maximum technologically feasible 
and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tions” possible.3 In considering different options, it 
seems likely that the board will eventually promote 
a cap-and-trade program. Although the act does not 
directly call upon the board to use market-based so-
lutions to reduce emissions, it seems that the board, 
along with many of California’s leaders, prefers a cap-
and-trade program over other alternatives.
It is easy to characterize AB 32 as a logical pro-
gression of California’s past actions related to climate 
change. The legislature has previously passed pioneer-
ing legislation that attempts to regulate GHG emis-
sions from its automobile fleet.4 Additionally, about 
two months before signing AB 32, Schwarzenegger 
signed an agreement with Prime Minister Tony Blair 
providing for the state and the United Kingdom to 
work cooperatively to address climate change.5 
The governor has issued an executive order that 
sets out an aggressive timeline for California to re-
duce its GHG emissions.6 The state’s bureaucracy 
has taken some steps to address the issue: the Cali-
fornia Public Utility Commission has instituted a 
process to cap GHG emissions for electricity gen-
erators.7 California has also 
gone to great lengths to invest 
in research to help the state 
understand the stakes it has in 
the climate change debate and 
the policies it could pursue to 
address the problem.8
Perhaps due to the stark 
contrast between California 
and the dearth of federal ac-
tion on climate change, AB 
32 has attracted the spotlight 
of the international stage. As 
Schwarzenegger signed the 
legislation, national and inter-
national leaders showed their 
support and praised AB 32. 
Blair noted that the signing cer-
emony represented a “historic 
day for the rest of the world as 
well.”9 Indeed, the backdrop for the signing ceremony 
— more than 100 flags of the world’s nations — high-
lights the global fanfare surrounding AB 32.
Given California’s role as a state, extraordinary cir-
cumstances surround AB 32. Outside of the media’s 
spotlight, it is easy to imagine that many others have 
wondered how AB 32 might impact them. Presum-
ably the shadow of the act has created discomfort for 
the president and others in Washington, D.C., who 
have advocated only modest and voluntary action to 
address climate change. Indeed, comments such as 
Schwarzenegger’s criticism of the federal government 
rang out loud and clear in the press: “California will 
not wait for our federal government to take strong 
What happens when two giants,  
climate change and the Constitution, 
come into conflict?
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action on global warming.”10 Those charged with 
negotiating our nation’s treaties may have wondered 
if California’s actions complicated the U.S. position. 
Additionally, those inside and outside the state who 
rely on the bounty of the California economy had 
to wonder whether they would help bear the cost of 
AB 32.
Because both the benefits and the costs of Cali-
fornia’s actions at least have the potential to extend 
beyond state lines, it should not be surprising that its 
actions raise some serious questions about whether 
the state has overstepped or will overstep its bounds. 
Depending on how the board implements AB 32, 
California’s enactment may raise constitutional con-
cerns, particularly if it settles on a cap-and-trade sys-
tem that impacts interstate commerce or attempts to 
broaden the relevant GHG market by coordinating 
the state’s GHG markets with those 
created in other countries.
This article is meant to provide 
California with some sound advice 
on the extent to which potential fed-
eral constitutional pitfalls surround 
the state’s action. We also understand 
that a growing number of states are 
on track to follow California’s steps. 
Given this, we highlight the fact that 
the analysis contained in this article has practical 
value for those outside the state.
The Problem of Leakage and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause
D
espite the simplicity of the goal, the 
state faces some significant challenges 
in creating an effective cap-and-trade 
system. One such barrier is that those 
outside California might undo any 
progress California makes inside its borders. In 
confronting a global problem, the fluid nature of 
the global economy can make it difficult to achieve 
and assess progress.
In order to ensure that any reductions within 
California translate to actual reductions of GHGs 
in the global atmosphere, the state’s implementing 
agencies will need to design a program that takes 
precautions to guarantee that gains from such re-
ductions are not lost through GHG increases else-
where. The danger in proceeding with indifference 
to such leakage is that it could undermine Califor-
nia’s goals.
Leakage is a common challenge for policies at-
tempting to reduce undesirable activities. For example, 
when a municipal police force institutes an aggressive 
attack on illegal drug sales, drug sellers may relocate to 
other jurisdictions and continue their illegal business. 
Within the electricity sector, relocating generating fa-
cilities to escape global warming regulation is implau-
sible, at least in the short term, but the 
electrical grid and the interchangeable 
nature of generated electricity means 
the market may respond by shifting 
production to unregulated facilities 
outside the state. The risk of leakage 
grows out of several factors including 
transportation costs, the pollution in-
tensity of the product, the ability of 
out-of-state producers to create similar 
products, the regulatory burden outside California, 
and the capacity of out-of-state producers to fill Cali-
fornia reductions.
The term leakage can have unfortunate conno-
tations. While it captures the concern that efforts 
within California may be undone by the response 
of the broader economy, it can also suggest that 
California will attempt to reach out beyond its bor-
ders to target troublemakers outside of the state. 
Instead, anti-leakage measures should be thought 
of as devices to plug holes in California’s regulatory 
program to prevent the benefits of that program 
from dissipating. So long as these measures are ap-
plied evenhandedly and without discriminatory ef-
fects on economic activity outside the state, they 
are appropriate measures for it to enact. The more 
that California looks outward or aims its program 
at outsiders, the more likely it is that the dormant 
Commerce Clause will cause problems. 
The Problem of Leakage in the Electricity Sector
Of all the sectors that a cap-and-trade program will 
likely cover, the utility industry faces the greatest 
challenges in curbing leakage. Transmission lines 
make transporting electricity simple and inexpen-
sive and electrons on the grid are indistinguish-
able from each other. California already purchases 
about one-quarter of its electricity from outside its 
borders. Because its in-state electricity production 
facilities largely rely on sources of power other 
than coal and gas, the imported power accounts 
for one-half of the GHG emissions attributable 
to California’s electricity use.11 Meanwhile, many 
out-of-state generators have excess capacity. If the 
state increasingly comes to rely on electricity pro-
duced outside of California, total GHG emissions 
for electricity used by Californians most likely will 
increase.
In evaluating California’s cap-and-trade program 
with the dormant Commerce Clause in mind, the 
constitutionality of any government action that 
implicates interstate commerce will in large part 
Because benefits and 
costs of California’s 
actions extend 
beyond state lines, 
questions arise as to 
their propriety
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turn on its objectives and whether the provisions of 
California’s cap-and-trade program can be defend-
ed as an effective and non-discriminatory means of 
achieving those objectives. The state’s basic objec-
tives for the program were defined by the California 
Legislature in AB 32:
The Legislature finds and declares all of the 
following:
(a) Global warming poses a serious threat to 
the economic well-being, public health, natural 
resources, and the environment of California. 
The potential adverse impacts of global warming 
include the exacerbation of air quality problems, 
a reduction in . . . the Sierra snowpack, a rise in 
sea levels . . . , damage to marine ecosystems and 
the natural environment, and an increase in . . . 
human health-related problems.
(b) Global warming will have detrimental 
effects on some of California’s largest indus-
tries. . . . It will also increase the strain on elec-
tricity supplies. . . .
(c) California has long been a national and 
international leader on energy conservation and 
environmental stewardship efforts. . . . The pro-
gram established by this division will continue 
this tradition. . . .
(d) National and international actions are 
necessary to fully address the issue of global 
warming. However, action taken by California 
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases will have 
far-reaching effects . . . .
(e) By exercising a global leadership role, 
California will also position its economy . . . to 
benefit from . . . efforts to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases . . . and will provide an oppor-
tunity for the state to take a . . . leadership role in 
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.12
These goals contrast starkly with the major con-
cern behind the dormant Commerce Clause, which 
is to prevent economic protectionism. Rather than 
protecting its internal economy, California aims 
to lead the way in taking actions that will help the 
world reduce the threat of climate change.
To understand why the state is justified in wor-
rying about leakage, it is useful to think about how 
leakage implicates its stated purposes in enacting 
AB 32. Put into the context of energy production 
and consumption, California’s purposes boil down 
to three recurring themes:
• Taking responsibility for emissions caused by 
the energy it produces and consumes;
• Reducing externalities related to its produc-
tion and consumption of energy; and
• Showing leadership as an environmental stew-
ard.
Leakage directly undermines all three of these 
objectives. California wants to take responsibility 
for the emissions that constitute its global warming 
footprint; leakage undermines that goal. Similarly, 
leakage undercuts the objective of reducing the 
externalities associated with its consumption and 
production of electricity; displacing its emissions 
with emissions outside the state leaves the global 
warming problem unaffected — or worsened. Fi-
nally, it is hard for California to show environmen-
tal leadership if leakages make the state’s regulatory 
structure ineffective.
The Constitution limits how California may go 
about negating the adverse effects of leakage. Just as a 
police chief cannot investigate and arrest drug dealers 
who have moved out of the chief ’s municipality and 
started up business somewhere else, 
states face limits in what they can 
do to minimize the adverse effects of 
leakage. So long as the cap-and-trade 
program places legal responsibilities 
on entities that remain in Califor-
nia or on sales of electricity to users 
in California, and so long as it does 
not place burdens on the entities or 
transactions that differ according to 
whether the electricity involved was generated inside 
or outside the state, its efforts ought to be sustained. 
The Dormant Commerce Clause 
Under the Constitution, the Congress has the pow-
er to regulate interstate commerce. The dormant 
Commerce Clause is an unwritten logical exten-
sion of Congress’s power that prevents states from 
usurping Congress’s authority to regulate interstate 
commerce.
At the heart of the dormant Commerce Clause is 
the principle that states are not allowed to discrimi-
nate against citizens of other states “simply to give 
a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”13 
The concern that states had erected trade barriers 
among them
reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that 
was an immediate reason for calling the Con-
stitutional Convention: the conviction that in 
order to succeed, the new union would have 
to avoid the tendencies toward economic Bal-
kanization that had plagued relations among the 
colonies and later among the [s]tates under the 
Articles of Confederation.14
Undoubtedly, the free flow of commerce among the 
The Constitution 
limits how 
California may go 
about negating the 
adverse effects of 
leakage
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states is one of the chief aspects of U.S. economic 
strength.
In reviewing dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenges, courts first look to whether the law discrimi-
nates against out-of-staters or attempts to regulate 
beyond a state’s jurisdiction. If a law does either of 
these, courts apply a strict scrutiny standard which 
is extremely difficult for a state to satisfy.15 If a law 
regulates evenhandedly and only attempts to reg-
ulate within its borders, it still receives dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny, but the courts apply a 
balancing test that is much more favorable to the 
state law.16
If a state law receives strict scrutiny, it is subject 
to a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.”17 Few laws 
— exactly one, in fact — have survived the strict 
scrutiny that the Court applies to discriminatory 
laws. Under the balancing test that courts apply to 
evenhanded laws — sometimes called the Pike bal-
ancing test — laws have much greater chances for 
success. In all cases, courts examine the terms of the 
law, the information before the state when it made 
the law, and the real-world impact of the law.
The first-order question for dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis is what level of scrutiny a 
court should apply. In order to ferret out a law that 
burdens interstate commerce, courts first look to 
whether a state regulation is discriminatory.
Discriminatory laws fall into two categories. 
Facially discriminatory laws are those that differ-
entiate between in-state and out-of-state entities in 
terms of the laws themselves. Facially neutral laws 
do not draw a distinction in terms of the law be-
tween in-state and out-of-state entities, but they are 
found to be discriminatory either because of their 
effects or their purposes.18
If a law is facially neutral, a court 
will review a law based on its impacts 
on interstate commerce.19 Whether 
a court deems a facially neutral state 
law discriminatory or neutral in ap-
plication largely depends on how the 
court characterizes the law’s applica-
tion. Here, courts focus primarily on 
the law’s practical effect, although a 
discriminatory purpose can also subject a law to 
strict scrutiny.20 If a facially neutral law does not 
create barriers to trade, prohibit the flow or increase 
the costs of interstate commerce, or distinguish be-
tween in-staters and out-of-staters, courts will find 
a law nondiscriminatory.21
Although strict scrutiny is usually reserved for 
discriminatory laws, there is also the special case of 
laws that attempt to “control conduct beyond the 
boundary of the state,” or extraterritorial legisla-
tion.22 Again, courts will look to see if a law explic-
itly is extraterritorial or has the “practical effect” of 
being extraterritorial. In evaluating whether a law 
has the practical effect of regulating conduct beyond 
state boundaries, courts consider the consequences 
of the law, how the challenged law interacts with 
other states’ regulations, and what would happen 
if many or all states adopted similar legislation.23 
After weighing these specific considerations, if the 
court finds that a state regulation would produce 
“inconsistent legislation,” it will apply strict scru-
tiny and consistently strike down such laws.24
Once a court determines that it should apply 
strict scrutiny, what does this mean? As a practical 
matter, it means that the state will almost certainly 
lose. The Court has upheld only one state law that 
was deemed to be a discriminatory state law25 and 
no state law that attempts to control conduct be-
yond the state’s boundaries.
From a more doctrinal perspective, in order to 
uphold a discriminatory or extraterritorial law, 
courts conduct a two-pronged inquiry: first, to find 
that the law has a legitimate and substantial pur-
pose and, second, to find that there are no less dis-
criminatory means of accomplishing that purpose. 
While courts look critically at both prongs, the bur-
den of showing that there are no less discriminatory 
means is an especially heavy one.26 If a court finds 
that there is any potentially less discriminatory way 
for a state to accomplish its purposes, the statute 
fails.27 Litigants and courts have proven to be very 
capable of finding less discriminatory means.28 As 
Justice Thurgood Marshall famously explained in 
another context: “Strict scrutiny is strict in theory 
but fatal in fact.”29 While that aphorism has not 
held true in the context of equal protection juris-
prudence,30 it remains true in the context of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.
When a state law is not discriminatory or ex-
traterritorial, courts apply the Pike balancing test. 
The Supreme Court articulated the standard for 
a balancing test for dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.31: “Where 
the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.”32
The Pike test requires courts to make a number 
of relatively subjective evaluations: whether the 
claimed local interest is “legitimate”; whether any 
“less burdensome” regulatory alternatives are avail-
able; and, ultimately, whether the alleged benefits 
of the regulation outweigh the burdens on inter-
Few laws — exactly 
one, in fact — 
survive the strict 
scrutiny that the 
Court applies to 
discriminatory laws
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state commerce.33 Because of the subjective nature 
of this test, the outcome is often difficult to pre-
dict.34
The Supreme Court has found that protecting 
the business reputation of in-state producers is a 
fairly insignificant interest.35 In contrast, the Court 
has found a wide range of purposes to be legitimate, 
including public safety,36 consumer protection,37 re-
source conservation, and environmental quality.38 
While courts have found many purposes legitimate, 
some interests may receive more weight than oth-
ers. For example, while the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized environmental protection as a legitimate 
local interest, it has done so on limited occasions 
and seems to prefer such interests be articulated in 
terms of public safety. This may particularly be the 
case with the current makeup of the 
Supreme Court.
In the Supreme Court’s recent 
environmental decision Massachu-
setts v. EPA,39 four dissenting jus-
tices would have held that the state 
challengers did not have standing 
to sue over harm caused by climate 
change40 and would have allowed the 
Environmental Protection Agency 
to reject GHGs as pollutants under the Clean Air 
Act.41 Similarly, in Rapanos v. United States,42 the 
same four justices dissented and read the Clean Wa-
ter Act in a way that would have sharply limited 
the reach of the act. Taken together, these cases sug-
gest the wisdom of framing the threats of climate 
change more broadly than environmental prob-
lems. Indeed, this is what the California legislature 
did in laying out its purposes for enacting AB 32.
While we suggest that states should cast a fairly 
wide net in framing their purpose, they need to un-
derstand that overstating the case may prove harm-
ful in the course of litigation. One reason for this 
is that it is critical that a state build a robust record 
justifying its purposes for action. Hollow reasons 
for action will make it difficult to build an adequate 
record. States should take time to draw a clear rela-
tionship between the state regulation and the harm 
it seeks to prevent. Additionally, it hurts states to 
concoct rationales out of thin air, because in pars-
ing a state’s purpose, courts are often skeptical about 
its purported interests, because enumerated reasons 
may actually be merely dressed up rationales that 
cloak economic protectionism. Our assessment 
is that the given purposes for enacting AB 32 are 
substantial and justifiable rationales for regulatory 
action. California should attempt to back up these 
rationales with an administrative record that shows 
a clear connection between the regulatory measures 
it chooses and the purposes set forth by the legis-
lature.
We can apply these dormant Commerce Clause 
principles to the leakage issue. If California aims to 
stop leakage by treating electricity generated outside 
of the state differently than electricity generated in-
side its borders, the state will almost certainly lose 
when facing a lawsuit based on dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds. This means that California should 
avoid making regulatory distinctions between in-
state energy and out-of-state energy and create a 
process that is blind to the location of energy pro-
duction. Similarly, if California attempts to stop 
leakage by attempting to regulate outside of Cali-
fornia, the state will likely lose. This means that the 
incidence of regulation — the events upon which 
regulatory requirements are imposed — ought to 
be easily describable as occurring within California. 
For example, the state might be tempted to require 
those generating energy to install costly equipment 
to monitor emissions. Imposing this burden outside 
of the state might invite the argument that Califor-
nia is regulating beyond its boundaries. In contrast, 
California might require that anyone selling elec-
tricity in the state of California be able to provide 
assurance that certain GHG-related standards are 
being met. Such assurance might be provided by 
continuous emissions monitors, but these would 
not have been directly mandated.
Given the stringency of the strict 
scrutiny test, California’s only vi-
able option is to regulate in such a 
way that courts will apply the Pike 
balancing test, or in other words, to 
create laws that do not discriminate 
or have extraterritorial effects.
With regard to the first compo-
nent of the Pike balancing test, a 
reviewing court will evaluate California’s legitimate 
interests in enacting a GHG cap-and-trade pro-
gram. The state’s interests as well as how those in-
terests are served by the measures it is taking should 
be substantiated by a record of evidence. Assuming 
that California builds a proper record to support 
its decision, a reviewing court should find that its 
interests are substantial. However, California can 
help a potential reviewing court see the policy in its 
most favorable light. To do so, the state will want to 
highlight those factors that receive greater recogni-
tion from reviewing courts.
With the justifications California has already 
laid out in AB 32,43 the state has started out on 
the right foot. In moving forward, we suggest that 
California keep four principles in mind when craft-
ing its regulations. 
California’s only 
option is to create 
laws that do not 
discriminate or  
have extra-
territorial effects
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First, it should create a process and rationale 
for action that focuses on regulating California. 
Not only should the state document its desire to 
regulate its own internal consumption and produc-
tion of GHGs, its actions should back this up. This 
means finding ways to run its program — includ-
ing its attempt to control leakage — that focus on 
actors operating within the state. 
Second, California should identify and stress the 
benefits that accrue specifically to the state. Even 
though California is attempting to lessen the im-
pact of a global problem, its strongest justification 
for taking state action is that this global problem 
has severe localized impacts. California’s record 
should explain how the actions that it takes are 
aimed at helping the state and should describe the 
local factors at risk. Again, the groundwork for this 
approach is already in place in the legislative pur-
poses found in AB 32.44
In a related vein, California should anticipate 
the argument that its efforts are futile. In other 
words, opponents in litigation might argue that re-
gardless of what California does, it will suffer the 
harm it seeks to avoid. In passing AB 32, Califor-
nia has emphasized its desire to show environmen-
tal leadership.45 Its desire to inspire others to act 
is important. The state should also make the case 
that the only way to solve international problems is 
for many to do their part. If every government had 
to wait for the world to agree before taking action, 
nothing would be done. California’s efforts to re-
duce the challenge make others more likely to act.
Third, California needs to take special pains to 
avoid even the appearance that its program is mo-
tivated by punishing out-of-staters. While we have 
no reason to anticipate that this would be any part 
of its motives, the record ought to 
reflect clearly that California is sole-
ly interested in taking responsibility 
for its share of the global warming 
problem, and not out of any desire 
to go after out-of-state bad guys. If 
such motivation became an impor-
tant element in its decision, even if 
only because rhetorically it is a way 
to generate in-state support, this will 
put the state on much less solid ground.
Fourth, in crafting its policy, California should 
avoid indicting the federal government for its lack 
of action. It should take care not to frame its efforts 
as an attempt to override federal policies on GHG 
regulation.46 While California can legitimately note 
that it is dissatisfied with national policies, it needs 
to walk a fine line so that it does not appear that the 
overriding motivation for the state’s action is to put 
a stick in the eye of the federal government.
With regard to the second prong of the Pike bal-
ancing test, a reviewing court will weigh Califor-
nia’s benefit against the burden its policies place on 
interstate commerce. Again, California can assist 
itself by intelligently designing its regulatory sys-
tem. While it is impossible to assess the burden of 
an unknown program, we do wish to provide two 
benchmarks that would lessen the impact on the 
interstate economy.
One benchmark policymakers should keep in 
mind is the more squarely that California can place 
the regulatory burden on in-state actors the better. 
For example, it could place its burden on load-
serving entities that transport electricity within the 
state, utilities that generate or sell electricity within 
the state, or consumers that consume within the 
state. Of course, in making its decision, California 
will want to reduce leakage, and it will somehow 
need to track both the energy produced outside the 
state but sold in California along with the electric-
ity produced in the state but exported elsewhere.
The second benchmark is that the simpler Cali-
fornia makes it for out-of-staters to comply with 
the state’s regulations, the better. The more bur-
densome the regulation, the more likely it is that a 
court will find that the state fails the Pike balancing 
test. This is important enough that it is not unrea-
sonable for the state to seriously consider making 
small concessions of the program’s effectiveness in 
order to accommodate this goal. Similarly, Califor-
nia will want to make sure that its policy will place 
out-of-staters that want to participate in California’s 
market on equal footing with in-staters. The theme 
should be that out-of-staters are only asked to do 
their fair share and that the burdens and processes 
that they encounter are no different from those of 
in-state producers.
In sum, we think that California’s legislation will 
survive a legal challenge under the dormant Com-
merce Clause if it avoids strict scrutiny, attaches 
regulatory obligations on events that can readily be 
described as in-state activities, and compiles a re-
cord documenting the effectiveness of its regulatory 
measures in accomplishing the state’s legitimate 
objectives. That said, California can do much to 
help its cause in the instance that a reviewing court 
weighs its regulation under the Pike balancing test. 
Climate change looms large in California’s future, 
as it does for the entire world. To build a strong 
record, the state needs to tie its actions to, and ex-
plain its policies in light of, those threats. Addition-
ally, it should avoid vilifying out-of-state interests 
or the federal government. Additionally, the state 
will help its cause if it makes it easy to comply with 
California needs 
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punishing out-of-
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its regulations and takes pains to assure that out-
of-staters do not have different burdens or have to 
comply with different processes than those required 
of in-staters.
Emissions Trading and the Dormant 
Foreign Policy Power
C
alifornia needs to remain aware of an-
other federal constitutional matter. The 
state has taken steps to initiate linkages 
between its own future cap-and-trade 
program and trading systems of foreign 
governments, which may implicate the Constitu-
tion’s dormant foreign relations power, a legal prin-
ciple which holds that the federal government is 
the ultimate authority with respect to U.S. foreign 
policy. Even though the federal government has de-
clined to take action against global warming explic-
itly, California may still be precluded from taking 
such action on its own because an 
agreement between California and 
foreign nations arguably undermines 
the nation’s foreign policy.
Under the 2006 agreement mak-
ing California and the United King-
dom partners in the war against glob-
al warming, the two will share best 
practices on market-based systems 
and jointly investigate new technol-
ogies. The agreement has been heralded as a beach-
head for those who hope to reduce GHGs and as 
a first step toward linking California’s market with 
the EU. Additionally, just this year, Schwarzeneg-
ger has entered into similar agreements with the 
state of Victoria in Australia, as well as the Cana-
dian provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, and 
Ontario.
In all the fanfare, the legal implications of such 
international connections have received little atten-
tion. In particular, the question remains whether 
the Constitution would even allow California to 
enter into an agreement with another foreign na-
tion. 
Extra-Jurisdictional Trading
As California considers adopting a cap-and-trade 
program, it will have to consider whether the sys-
tem will issue credits for offsets made outside of the 
state. In considering this question, it will likely have 
to balance the purposes of its program. On one 
hand, allowing extra-jurisdictional offsets provides 
opportunities for California to lower the cost of re-
ducing emissions; larger markets generally increase 
diversity, which would lead to increased reductions 
and a more economically efficient program. On the 
other hand, extra-jurisdictional offsets reduce the 
incentives for California to reform its own depen-
dence on fossil fuels. Extra-jurisdictional offsets are 
also more difficult to monitor effectively, which de-
creases certainty that claimed reductions are actual 
reductions.
Particularly in light of concerns regarding moni-
toring, California may consider limiting offsets to 
other states and even foreign governments that have 
reliable GHG markets in place. For example, Cali-
fornia could limit its program to those states that 
have joined with California — at least in principle 
— to create the Western Regional Climate Action 
Initiative or perhaps expand its reach to the sev-
eral northeastern and mid-Atlantic states that cur-
rently are developing a regional strategy to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions, a program known as the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. If California 
could allow entities in its program to trade with 
other states, this larger domestic market could ben-
efit both California and the other states by provid-
ing more opportunities for low-cost reductions and 
more stability in trading markets.
California may also decide to look outside of the 
United States. International cooperation to reduce 
GHG emissions has already begun to take place. 
In 1992, 180 countries signed the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.47 Ne-
gotiations under the climate con-
vention led to the Kyoto Protocol, 
which entered into force in 2005. It 
requires member nations to achieve 
an averaged 5.2 percent reduction in 
1990 GHG levels by 2012.48 In or-
der to meet these requirements, the 
EU has recently initiated the largest 
GHG trading market in the world, 
the Emissions Trading Scheme, cov-
ering 25 countries and 6 major industrial sectors.49 
California may find great program savings if it 
honored offsets in the ETS market (beyond that re-
quired by Kyoto) to count toward California’s pro-
gram. Furthermore, the agreement by Schwarzeneg-
ger and Blair and those signed with other jurisdic-
tions subsequently hint that California is seriously 
considering a market-based cap-and-trade program 
to reduce GHGs, which could potentially be linked 
to the ETS or to other carbon markets outside the 
United States.50
At this point, it is only speculation whether the 
ETS or other foreign carbon markets would incor-
porate outside actors — particularly those govern-
ments that are part of a nation that has not rati-
fied the Kyoto Protocol, such as a U.S. state. The 
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ETS, however, does allow members to participate 
in international emissions trading with any party 
included in Annex B of the Protocol.51 Annex B 
includes the United States, so the EU could poten-
tially link with individual U.S. states as subsidiaries 
of an Annex B nation.52 Again, it is at least plausible 
that California and the EU nations could benefit 
from such an international partnership.53
The Dormant Foreign Relations Power
If the California Air Resources Board decides to 
adopt a cap-and-trade program to reduce GHGs 
that is linked to the ETS or some other foreign 
carbon market, there might be significant legal im-
plications. In Article I, the Constitution provides 
Congress the power to “regulate commerce with 
foreign nations.”54 The Court has read that to mean 
that the federal government has 
authority to conduct foreign rela-
tions.55 Furthermore, the president 
has extensive foreign relations pow-
ers56 and speaks with the country’s 
supreme voice on foreign policy.57 
The president also has the authority 
to enter into treaties with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.58
All this is not to say that a state 
government does not have any way to engage in 
agreements with international partners or to con-
duct business with firms from other nations. Rather, 
it means that a state cannot interfere with the fed-
eral government’s ability to create foreign policy — 
in other words, federal statutes dealing with foreign 
affairs, international treaties, and federal executive 
agreements preempt state regulations that interfere 
with them.59
Article VI states that federal law, including trea-
ties, is the “supreme law of the land.”60 State laws 
that conflict with federal action must yield to fed-
eral power. The preemption of state laws can be ei-
ther express or implied. Express preemption occurs 
when a federal statute explicitly says a state may not 
pass a law addressing a particular issue. Alterna-
tively, implied preemption can occur in three dif-
ferent ways. First, a state statute can be preempted 
if it invades a field of federal law that is “so perva-
sive”61 that there is no room for state regulation. 
This is called “field preemption.”62 Second, a state 
statute that is in direct conflict with federal law is 
preempted.63 Finally, a state statute that “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”64 
can also be preempted.
At times, the Court has interpreted the field of 
foreign policy to be so broad that some state stat-
utes which conflict with federal diplomacy have 
been deemed preempted without contradicting 
specific foreign agreements — the dormant foreign 
relations power.65 While the Court has employed it 
sparsely, this broad power has been used to preempt 
state laws even if there is not an express treaty on 
the matter, even if the state law is not in direct con-
flict with foreign treaties, and even if the state law 
does not impede federal objectives directly.
Undercurrents of a dormant foreign relations 
power first surfaced in 1968 in Zschernig v. Miller.66 
In that case, the Court evaluated an Oregon pro-
bate statute that allowed foreign nationals to inherit 
property in Oregon only if their country of citizen-
ship recognized a reciprocal right for American citi-
zens to inherit property and only if there was proof 
that the country of the foreign national would not 
confiscate the property in question.67 Even though 
the statute did not directly conflict with federal law 
or treaties, the Court concluded it was “an intrusion 
by the state into the field of foreign affairs which 
the Constitution entrusts to the president and the 
Congress.”68 It developed a direct effects test which 
meant state statutes directly affecting foreign policy 
in a negative way would be preempted.69
A 2003 case, American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi,70 is the only other one in which the 
Court has expressly relied on the dormant for-
eign relations power to preempt a 
state statute. Garamendi dealt with 
a California statute called the Ho-
locaust Victim’s Insurance Relief 
Act of 1999. The Court found that 
the Constitution forbade California 
from using HVIRA because it com-
promised the president’s diplomatic 
relations and on this basis struck 
down the law. The Court concluded 
foreign policy interests outweighed state interests in 
the matter of “vindicating victims” of war crimes.71
In Garamendi, the Supreme Court set up a two-
step analysis, the first of which determined whether 
the state statute in question involved a traditional 
state interest. If a state law affecting foreign policy 
did not fall under traditional state competence, the 
Court suggested the state law should be preempted 
whether or not the federal government had already 
acted.72 While the Court has yet to employ this 
type of preemption, it seems quite similar to that 
of the dormant Commerce Clause’s strict scrutiny 
standard. If a state law did address a topic of tradi-
tional state competence, the Court held that state 
laws were to be reviewed under a balancing test. In 
such a circumstance, the Court explained that it 
would weigh the strength of the foreign policy in-
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terest against the importance of the state concern.73 
While this line of case law is far from completely 
developed, it appears to work very similarly to the 
balancing test used for dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges.
To be sure, states are usually not precluded from 
acting unless the federal government has directly 
spoken to an issue through statute or treaty, or un-
less the state action would directly conflict with 
federal action. But Garamendi illustrates a narrow 
exception to that general rule. In cases like Gara-
mendi, state action can be preempted if it interferes 
with federal diplomatic efforts. As a result, Califor-
nia, or any other state, should take care when em-
barking on international agreements.
California’s ability to expand its market to 
include offsets outside of the United States
Starting with the premise that states can act as long 
as the federal government has not acted, it would 
seem that states are not precluded from develop-
ing international trading agreements for GHG 
emissions. Although the federal government has 
expressed various positions on climate change 
through a number of different channels, none of 
them directly preempts California from incorporat-
ing offsets outside of the United States into its state 
program.
In 1997, the U.S. Senate approved a resolution 
that declared that the United States would not ratify 
any international agreement on climate change un-
less the agreement required adequate emission con-
trols on developing countries and did not cause the 
United States economic harm.74 President George 
W. Bush has stated that his administration is op-
posed to the Kyoto Protocol because it does not in-
clude major carbon-producing countries, like Chi-
na.75 These statements demonstrate that the federal 
government will not presently act to reduce GHGs 
under Kyoto. This does not mean that states are 
precluded from acting as a result. President Bush 
also has entered into an executive agreement with 
Asian nations, called the Asia-Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate, which focuses on 
encouraging the development of new technology 
that can reduce GHG emissions.76 The partnership 
is the only formal action that deals explicitly with 
federal government action on climate change. It is 
proper to ask whether this is preemption by an ex-
ecutive agreement. It does not appear that it is. The 
partnership does not expressly preempt state law. In 
fact, the charter states that the partnership is meant 
to complement and not to replace the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, and that it will build on other global initia-
tives. Thus, it seems rather than prohibiting action, 
the partnership seeks to encourage other efforts 
to reduce GHG emissions.77 Furthermore, given 
that the agreement focuses on developing clean 
technologies, rather than economic cap-and-trade 
programs, a state statute to initiate carbon trading 
with the EU is unlikely to directly conflict with or 
impede the partnership.
It should be noted that Congress has recently 
been considering a number of bills to address cli-
mate change and doing so with increasing fervor.78 
If any of these bills are ratified, state 
cap-and-trade programs might be 
more directly preempted. For now, 
however, we are operating under the 
assumption that the federal govern-
ment has not taken any direct action 
to establish a cap-and-trade program 
in the United States.
Because state carbon trading 
schemes are not explicitly preempt-
ed, to the extent that the federal government pro-
hibits California from setting up a trading system 
that cooperates with foreign countries, it would 
have to be under the narrow exception of Garamen-
di, or the dormant foreign relations power. In fact, 
the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA suggests 
that a state’s ability to act on the international stage 
in this very context of climate change is limited:
When a state enters the union, it surrenders 
certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts 
cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negoti-
ate an emissions treaty with China or India, and 
in some circumstances the exercise of its police 
powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emis-
sions might well be pre-empted.79
The relevant question, then, is whether Gara-
mendi can be distinguished from the case of an 
international agreement on GHG emissions reduc-
tions between California and the EU. Basically, if 
the California Air Resources Board is able to dem-
onstrate how trading regulations do not fall within 
the Garamendi exception, those regulations will be 
more robust to potential constitutional challenges.
One difference between the insurance laws in 
Garamendi, as compared with a GHG trading 
market, is that the insurance laws implicated the 
president’s wartime power. In other words, when a 
state’s law implicates the president’s ability to bro-
ker peace, the executive’s dormant foreign relations 
power is particularly powerful. In fact, the Court 
in Garamendi specifically noted that the executive 
would not normally have had as much power to 
If Congress does 
enact a climate 
change law, state 
cap-and-trade 
programs might be 
directly preempted
Page 60 ❧ T H E  E N V I R O N M E N T A L  F O R U M
Copyright © 2008, Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, D.C. www.eli.org. 
Reprinted by permission from The Environmental Forum®, July/August 2008
regulate claims from private entities, but with re-
gard to wartime claims, the public and the private 
sectors become blurred.80 In contrast to the laws at 
issue in Garamendi, California’s GHG regulations 
avoid compromising the president’s wartime au-
thority.
A cap-and-trade market linking California with 
the EU would be aimed at facilitating private volun-
tary exchanges, not at resolving public international 
disputes. It is not as if California would be ratify-
ing a formal policy with the EU on how to address 
climate change, but rather it would only serve to 
facilitate efficient trading markets. While it is true 
that public regulations would need to be in place in 
order to ensure an efficient trading scheme, the pri-
vate market would be controlling the trades, rather 
than public negotiations. As a result, international 
diplomacy is not at stake in as precarious a way as 
it was in Garamendi or as in the illustrative example 
of initiating formal talks with China, as the Court 
described in Massachusetts v. EPA. It would be im-
portant for the California Air Resources Board to 
emphasize this distinction in its regulations and 
focus on the private rather than public aim of any 
negotiations that would include the EU.
Another difference between Garamendi and 
emissions trading markets is that emissions trading 
fits more easily within a traditional state interest. 
In Garamendi, the Court stated that California was 
not acting within a traditional state interest by en-
acting regulations directing insurance companies to 
disclose Holocaust-era insurance claims. As com-
pared to the limited aim of redressing Holocaust 
victims in Garamendi, a GHG emissions trading 
scheme would have much broader 
relevance for the entire state.
In large part, just as governmen-
tal purpose established in the record 
will control the dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis, the record built by 
the California Air Resources Board 
during its decisionmaking process 
will fundamentally determine how a 
court would view California’s inter-
est. It is not hard to imagine that in formulating 
regulations for a cap-and-trade system, one reason 
California might move forward is to make up for 
what might be viewed as the failure of the federal 
government to take any meaningful international 
action on climate change. Indeed, the fact that the 
federal government has not entered into the Kyoto 
Protocol might have great value as symbolic poli-
tics. The more that California articulates an inter-
est in trying to demonstrate the inadequacies of the 
federal approach, the more its own characterization 
suggests a desire to set up a conflict between federal 
policy and state policy — and the closer it gets to 
the dormant foreign affairs line.
Particularly problematic would be an effort by 
California to try to use its program to somehow 
reform the international trading system formed by 
Kyoto, perhaps by insisting on some change to its 
trading or processes before California would con-
cede to reciprocity of emission credits. If this is the 
case, as suggested in Massachusetts v. EPA, Califor-
nia would have very weak footing. The Court has 
long recognized a prominent federal interest in for-
eign commerce, just as it has its interest in interstate 
commerce. For example in Japan Line, Ltd. v. City 
of Los Angeles,81 the Court struck down a state tax 
on Japanese shipping companies, stating, “foreign 
commerce is preeminently a matter of national 
concern.”82 It would be wise for California to avoid 
renegotiating existing Kyoto conditions during any 
discussions.
Thus, California would be smart to build a 
strong record emphasizing the ways in which the 
state would benefit from both its program and its 
desire to reduce costs of the program on its regu-
lated community. While the particular method of 
establishing an international trading system may be 
a novel approach to minimizing the cost of exercis-
ing police power, the idea of both seeking efficiency 
and attempting to protect and look after its citizens 
is a very familiar one for state lawmakers.
The theme California may want to emphasize 
is that its trading scheme would increase environ-
mental well-being by encouraging the reduction of 
GHGs while saving businesses money by allowing 
them to trade carbon credits in a larger market. In 
particular, it should make clear that linking state 
initiatives to the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
or other foreign carbon markets has the potential of 
making it easier for state businesses to comply with 
stringent emission caps because the ETS is such a 
large and comprehensive market.83
Both the private nature of emissions trading 
regulations that would include Europe and the fact 
that such regulations would align with traditional 
state interests serve to distinguish Garamendi from 
an emissions trading scheme. Yet, it may still be ar-
gued that the federal government has a federal in-
terest to speak with one voice in continued negotia-
tions and that if California were to incorporate in-
ternational cooperation into its trading system, the 
United States would have less clout as a hold out. 
It could also be argued that establishing a trading 
initiative between foreign governments and U.S. 
states would interfere with the administration’s 
protests against the Kyoto Protocol. The argument 
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may go that if Kyoto member nations can deal with 
states individually, there is less allure to meet U.S. 
demands. This is something that California should 
keep in mind as it begins to consider opening dis-
cussions with foreign governments. In the end, the 
state should proceed gingerly when attempting to 
bridge markets. The more that California attempts 
to engage in negotiations about economic or politi-
cal discrepancies between trading systems, the more 
likely that it will enter the realm of foreign policy.
While it is uncertain whether it would be possi-
ble for California to create an economically advan-
tageous and politically feasible trading system with 
foreign governments considering the constitutional 
limits inherent, it would be prudent for the Cali-
fornia Air Resources Board to include a severability 
clause in relation to any regulations linking Califor-
nia with foreign carbon markets. With that added 
protection, California could ensure that a cap-and-
trade system could still exist within the state even 
if it was unable to formally establish a trading rela-
tionship with foreign governments.
Conclusion
I
n this promising time for GHG regulation in 
California, the state faces some critical choices 
about how to structure its cap-and-trade pro-
gram. Its decisions will create different political 
winners and losers and will have distinct im-
plications for the program’s efficiency, equity, and 
administrative costs. Among the many factors that 
California ought to consider are the constitutional 
implications of combating leakage 
and extending a trading market into 
international territory.
The fate of California’s ability to 
control leakage will hinge on wheth-
er the state can take actions without 
triggering strict scrutiny under the 
dormant Commerce Clause. Fa-
cially discriminatory laws, laws with 
discriminatory effects or purposes, 
or laws that regulate outside a state’s jurisdiction 
always face strict scrutiny. When a law is nondis-
criminatory and does not reach outside the state’s 
jurisdiction, courts are likely to utilize the less strin-
gent Pike balancing test. In large part, Pike requires 
courts to weigh the burden a law places on inter-
state commerce against the purported benefit of the 
law.
Because of the subjective nature of this test, the 
upshot of judicial review is often difficult to pre-
dict. Part of the challenge is that this balancing 
test requires the reviewing court to balance incom-
mensurate values. To succeed under the Pike test, 
California should find a way to regulate the carbon 
content of electricity by focusing entirely on Cali-
fornia entities. In doing so, it should ensure that 
its regulation does not place an unequal burden on 
out-of-staters who are navigating 
the regulations in order to achieve 
compliance.
Finding the right balance may 
prove challenging. But creating a 
program that exceeds constitutional 
limits will prove fatal. If California 
invests ahead of time in addressing 
constitutional concerns, it will not 
have to invest after the fact in de-
fending a program that cannot withstand judicial 
scrutiny.
International linkages between California’s trad-
ing market and the carbon markets of other na-
tions might yield a ground-breaking step toward 
an efficient market in GHG emissions trading 
throughout the world. But this does not resolve the 
constitutional challenges associated with building 
this market. Action by California that is directed 
toward foreign governments may be preempted 
by the dormant foreign relations power under the 
Garamendi exception. Of course, Garamendi is a 
limited holding, and the facts of Garamendi may 
be distinguished from a GHG trading program in 
California that would incorporate trading with for-
eign nations.
As it begins to develop a program to address 
GHG emissions, the California Air Resources Board 
should attempt to emphasize the differences be-
tween Garamendi and any link between California 
and foreign nations in order to make a future trad-
ing program robust. In particular, the board should 
highlight the private, as opposed to public, nature of 
a trading market. The board should also develop a 
record that demonstrates how GHG trading markets 
can be classified as a traditional state interest. Finally, 
the board should consider including a severability 
clause in its regulations that would allow it to termi-
nate relations with the EU if necessary while keeping 
the rest of a trading program intact. Overall, it may 
be legally difficult for California to develop relations 
with foreign nations in an attempt to combat global 
warming and even potentially to enter into the ETS 
or other foreign carbon trading markets, but the state 
may decide the benefits are worth the effort. If so, as 
it moves forward, California should remain aware of 
the legal challenges and attempt to avoid interfering 
with international negotiations surrounding climate 
change reductions. • 
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